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In this article, Professor Hollis-Brusky revisits the claim, first advanced
in a 1999 Duke University Law Review article by Professor Jonathan Turley,
that impeachment is best understood as a “Madisonian Device”; that is, as
a valuable political process that allows for factional interests and pressures
to be resolved within our constitutional system. Drawing on Madison’s Federalist No. 10, Professor Turley argued for the importance of the Senate trial
in particular as a means of channeling factional pressures through a set of
representatives who would refine and enlarge the public view, lending legitimacy to our system of democratic governance. In this way, Professor Turley
argued, impeachment serves a much broader purpose than simply the removal of a President for a set of legalistic, narrowly defined “high crimes
and misdemeanors.”
While Professor Hollis-Brusky agrees that impeachment stills serves a
broader purpose within our Madisonian system, she argues that forces such
as political polarization, party tribalism, the advent of “fake news,” and
partisan media have challenged Professor Turley’s analysis of the value of
impeachment as a factional pressure release valve and of the Senate trial as
a forum for deliberative democracy and legitimacy-building. Instead, Professor Hollis-Brusky argues that impeachment should be understood in light
of Madison’s Federalist No 51—as an “auxiliary precaution” that should be
deployed to strengthen and fortify the “primary control” available in our
system to protect against bad actors and abuses of public trust and power.
That “primary control,” according to Madison, is the electoral process—
voting and elections. Professor Hollis-Brusky draws from comparative political science to show that the Trump impeachment serves a distinctly Madisonian function by fortifying the democratic process and, when coupled with
the upcoming elections, could provide a “hard reboot” for our political system.
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INTRODUCTION
A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary
precautions. 1

11/23/2020 10:40:39

1. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
2. See The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for
Presidential Impeachment Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of
Professor Jonathan Turley) (“I have spent decades writing about impeachment and presidential powers
as an academic and as a legal commentator. My academic work reflects the bias of a Madisonian
scholar.”).
3. Id. at 2 n.3 (citing Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a
Madisonian Device, 49 D UKE L.J.1 (1999) and Jonathan Turley, Reflections on Murder, Misdemeanors,
and Madison, 28 H OFST RA L. R E V . 439, 439 (1999)).
4. Jonathan Turley, Senate Trials and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, 49 D UK E L.J. 1 (1999).
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On December 4, 2019 Professor Jonathan Turley appeared before the House Judiciary Committee as the lone witness for the Republican Party in the impeachment hearings against Donald Trump.
On page two of his fifty-three page written testimony—in which he
argues against impeaching Trump—Turley characterizes himself
as a “Madisonian scholar.” 2 Indeed, of the five law review articles
Turley references in his testimony as evidence of his decades-long
research on impeachment, two have “Madison” or “Madisonian” in
the title. 3 One of these articles is of particular interest here, as
Turley’s impeachment testimony relied heavily on it: Senate Trials
and Factional Disputes: Impeachment as a Madisonian Device. 4
In this 1999 law review article, James Madison’s Federalist
No. 10 emerges as the Rosetta Stone of Professor Turley’s understanding of the overarching purpose of our constitutional system.
In summary, Professor Turley argues that the impeachment process
is but one of many elements built into our constitutional design to
process, diffuse, and refine the pressures of opposing “factions” in
our democracy. In the context of his argument, Professor Turley
emphasizes the value of the Senate trial as a mechanism of deliberative democracy designed to refine and enlarge the factional
pressures and views of the masses in a way that results in increased
systemic legitimacy. In doing so, Professor Turley outlines a broad
understanding of impeachment as a vital process for resolving factional divides and pressures, rather than a narrow way to hold
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I.IMPEACHMENT AS A MADISONIAN DEVICE CIRCA 1999
A.Impeachment as a Madisonian Device

11/23/2020 10:40:39

Professor Turley’s 1999 Duke University Law Review article provides
a lengthy and detailed history of impeachment hearings and Senate trials,
reviewing impeachments from the early English and colonial periods all the

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 28 Side A

officers to account for legalistically defined “crimes.” Part I of
this article reviews Professor Turley’s argument in greater detail
for how and why impeachment should be understood as a “Madisonian device” and the implications of his analysis for what rises
to the threshold of impeachable conduct.
Over the past two decades, a series of powerful forces have
combined to undermine the efficacy of the Madisonian system Professor Turley centers in his analysis—a system predicated on the
ability to channel, diffuse, and mitigate the “mischiefs of faction.”
These forces, as I describe in Part II, include, first, increasing political polarization of partisans in government and in the electorate,
which has led to party tribalism and party loyalty at all costs. Second, the democratization and fragmentation of media has led to
partisan and polarized media, decreasing levels of trust in information (“fake news”), and the ability to discredit and destabilize
expertise and testimony. I show how these developments challenge
Professor Turley’s analysis of the value of impeachment as a factional pressure release valve and of the Senate trial as a forum for deliberative democracy and legitimacy-building.
That being said, I argue in Part III of this article that impeachment can and should still be understood as a “Madisonian device,”
but with a different emphasis. I draw on American history and contemporary comparative political science to show that impeachments in general—
and the Trump impeachment in particular—can be understood as an “auxiliary precaution” deployed in service of strengthening and fortifying what
Madison described as the “primary check” on bad actors and abuses of power
in our constitutional system—voting and the democratic process. In other
words, if we center Madison’s Federalist No. 51 instead of Madison’s Federalist No. 10, we extract a slightly different core principle from our constitutional architecture. As measured against this Madisonian principle, the
impeachment of Donald Trump still holds value and meaning and should still
be properly understood as a “Madisonian device.”
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5. Id. at 110.
6. See The Impeachment Inquiry into President Donald J. Trump: Constitutional Grounds for
Presidential Impeachment Before H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (written testimony of
Professor Jonathan Turley).
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 71–79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
8. Id. at 72.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 73.
11. Id. at 76.

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 28 Side B

way through the Clinton impeachment hearings. 5 Interestingly, much of this
history appeared in Professor Turley’s written testimony for the House Judiciary Committee in the impeachment hearings of Donald Trump.6 In the law
review article, unlike in his most recent congressional testimony, these episodes are all then processed, digested, and analyzed through the lens of
James Madison’s Federalist No. 10. 7
Like the other essays that collectively comprise what we now refer to
as The Federalist Papers, Madison’s Federalist No. 10 was written anonymously in 1787 under the pseudonym, “Publius,” in the hopes of persuading
the people of New York to adopt the new Constitution. In a nutshell, Federalist No. 10 explains how the revised constitutional design improves upon
older models of democratic government that were vulnerable to what Madison termed the “mischiefs of faction.” 8
Madison defines a “faction” as “a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.” 9 Factions, as Madison explains, tend to wreak havoc on democracies,
especially when there are large, permanent factions that seek to oppress and
limit political opportunities of minority factions. Because, Madison observes, the causes of faction—liberty and freedom of conscience—are “sown
in the nature of man” and cannot be removed without extinguishing individuality of thought, the new constitutional republic would focus instead on
controlling and redirecting the effects of factions.10
Essentially, Madison argues, this is done in three ways: (1) by dividing
power vertically and horizontally to make it difficult for a single majority
faction to gain power and representation; (2) by encouraging the existence
of lots of factions or interest groups to promote fluidity of factional allegiances and cross-cutting coalitions; and (3) by electing representatives, especially in the Senate, who would “refine and enlarge” the factional views
of the more passionate, less deliberate democratic masses. 11
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Professor Turley summarizes how these three elements built into the
Madisonian system effectively “destabilize[e] the effects of factional disputes” and “transform factional interests” that might otherwise boil up and
boil over in our democracy:
In crafting the American legislative process, Madison sought to address
the destabilizing effects of factional disputes within democratic systems.
Madison believed that leaving such disputes unaddressed would create intrigue and instability within a political system. For that reason, the Madisonian process does not seek to suppress, but to transform factional
interests. This emphasis on resolving factional disputes gives the system
the ability to withstand crushing pressures during periods of enormous social, political, and economic turmoil. 12

Professor Turley is not the first scholar to emphasize the centrality of
Federalist No. 10 to our constitutional and political architecture. Political
scientists, in particular Robert Dahl, have centered this essay prominently in
discussions of “pluralism” and democracy since the 1950s. 13 However, Professor Turley does seem to be the first scholar to apply these Madisonian
insights squarely to the impeachment clauses of the United States Constitution. 14
Professor Turley argues that if we situate the impeachment power
within the architecture of Madison’s Federalist No. 10 and apply that essay’s
preoccupation with channeling and refining factional tensions and pressures
to the impeachment clauses, then these clauses necessarily demand a broader
understanding than the narrower, legalistic interpretation advanced by other
scholars. In this vein, Professor Turley argues that his Madisonian reading
of impeachment cuts against arguments that “tend to elevate removal as the
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 29 Side A
11/23/2020 10:40:39

12. Turley, Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, supra note 4, at 4.
13. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 105–12 (1st ed. 1956); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB.
L. 279, 282 (1957); Martin Diamond, The American Idea of Equality: The View from the Founding, 38
REV. POL. 313, 329 (1976); Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralism and Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 734,
737 (1983); James Yoho, Madison on the Beneficial Effects of Interest Groups: What Was Left Unsaid in
“Federalist” 10, 27 POLITY 587 (1995); Ian Shapiro, Tyranny and Democracy: Reflections on Some
Recent Literature, 43 GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION 486 (2008).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7 (“The
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. Judgment in
Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”);
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes
and Misdemeanors.”).
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primary purpose of impeachment in a narrow band of cases” and that advocates of this narrow understanding “would radically reduce the role of impeachment in addressing the factional disputes and legitimacy questions”
that are often at the core of impeachment proceedings. 15
With Madison’s Federalist No. 10 as his touchstone, Professor Turley
argues that the impeachment process should be understood as a “tool of factional resolution.” 16 This is especially so, he insists controversially, in cases
where the actual removal of a President is “unlikely due to [the lack of] bipartisan consensus”—so in cases where it is least likely to succeed by traditional metrics. It is during these times, when “large factional groups are in
dispute over questions of legitimacy,” Professor Turley insists, that impeachment “can play its most valuable and transformative role.”17
B.Senate Trials and Factional Disputes
In making his somewhat counterintuitive case for impeachment especially when removal is unlikely, Professor Turley emphasizes the importance
and value of the Senate trial as a critical forum for factional dispute resolution (or at least transformation):
The factional disputes raised by allegations of misconduct by a President
or judge demand resolution in a public forum. The Senate trial supplies a
forum that would not be possible in any other branch. In the Senate trial
of a President, representatives of all three branches are present in a proceeding in which all factional views can be openly expressed and debated.
This is vitally important to the integrity of the system, as it has often
changed the views of both senators and the public regarding the basis of
impeachment allegations. 18

Turley, Impeachment as a Madisonian Device, supra note 4, at 34.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 84.
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 107.

11/23/2020 10:40:39

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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Not just any Senate trial will do, however. Drawing on lessons learned
from history and from his reading of Madison’s Federalist No. 10, Professor
Turley argues that the Senate must allow “a full presentation of evidence”
and must not limit witnesses in order to serve as a forum for deliberative
democracy and to facilitate trust and integrity in the process, especially when
“a partisan block promises to prevent conviction.” 19
It is only through the open presentation of evidence and witnesses, Professor Turley insists, that the Senate trial can serve to, in Madisonian parlance, “refine and enlarge” the public’s views and transform factional (or in
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today’s parlance, partisan) allegiances. However, if the Senate trial is perceived as a foregone conclusion, as driven by clearly identifiable factional
interests, the process could be damaging “to the public trust.” 20 Specifically,
Professor Turley warns that “an acquittal based on tailored evidence is as
dangerous as a conviction secured on such a basis” because it will lead to the
persistence of factional divides, as there will always be questions about the
“legitimacy of the process.” 21
In concluding his analysis—an analysis, as several observers have
pointed out, which seems to be at odds with his position against impeaching
President Donald Trump22—Professor Turley defends the impeachment of
President William Jefferson Clinton as legitimate within this Madisonian understanding and as consistent with history and past practice. In doing so,
Professor Turley once again emphasizes that impeachment is a political, not
legal, process, that it was never intended to be limited to a narrow range of
legalistically defined “high crimes and misdemeanors” (as the Trump legal
defense team argued in their 110 page legal brief 23), and that it was especially
concerned with perceived abuses of the public trust, abuse of power, and
other non-criminal behaviors for which a public trial and account would be
beneficial and important.

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 30 Side A
11/23/2020 10:40:39

20. Id.
21. Id. at 133.
22. See, e.g., Sonam Sheth, The GOP’s only impeachment witness on Wednesday contradicted his
own previous testimony, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 4, 2019, 2:23 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/republican-witness-jonathan-turley-contradicted-impeachment-testimony-2019-12 [https://perma.cc/KSY9QUZ7]; Charles P. Pierce, Jonathan Turley is Exhibit A That The Clinton Debacle Never Ended, ESQUIRE
(Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/a30122007/jonathan-turley-impeachment-hearing-trump-ukraine/ [https://perma.cc/7LS6-H2PB]; Elie Mystal, The Republican’s Star Impeachment Scholar Is a Shameless Hack: Jonathan Turley’s testimony was so inconsistent, it contradicted
his own previous statements on impeachment, THE NATION (Dec. 5, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/turley-impeachment-hypocrisy/ [https://perma.cc/U7KJ-23C8]; Jennifer Rubin,
Even the Republican witness helped the Democrats, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2019, 6:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/12/05/even-republican-witness-helped-democrats/
[https://perma.cc/WNR4-X56R]; James D. Zirin, The shifting impeachment positions of Jonathan Turley,
THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/473227-the-shifting-impeachment-positions-of-jonathan-turley [https://perma.cc/TXT4-AZAE].
23. In Proceedings Before the United States Senate: Trial Memorandum of President Donald J.
Trump,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan.
20,
2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Trial-Memorandum-of-President-Donald-J.-Trump.pdf [https://perma.cc/HMM9-E6S9].
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II. WRENCHES IN THE MADISONIAN MACHINE—POLITICAL
POLARIZATION, PARTY TRIBALISM, AND “ALTERNATIVE FACTS”
A. Political Polarization and Party Tribalism

24.
25.
26.

11/23/2020 10:40:39

See, e.g., GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES,
284 (2009).
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 7, at 76 (James Madison).
See generally ROBERT DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? (1961).

AND KILLS POLITICS

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 30 Side B

Madison’s insights in The Federalist No. 10 have been key to how
American legal scholars and political scientists have theorized about constitutional structure, political process, and participation— especially since the
mid-twentieth century. To wit, in his book Law’s Allure, political scientist
Gordon Silverstein refers to our constitutional design as the “Madisonian
machine.” 24 The so-called Madisonian machine functions best, political scientists have noted, under two conditions: (1) when there are many smaller,
fluid factions (or interest groups) vying for power in our democracy; and (2)
when the Senate functions in a truly deliberative manner, “refin[ing] and enlarg[ing]” (to borrow Madisonian language) these narrow factional interests
in service of the broader interests of the country. 25 As I describe below, each
of these elements of the Madisonian machine has broken down over the past
two decades—and these breakdowns have been especially visible and acute
in the impeachment and removal effort against Donald Trump.
Political scientists have tended to operationalize Madison’s Federalist
No. 10 under the theory of “pluralism.” 26 In general, healthy pluralism is
when citizens belong to multiple different factions and have cross-cutting
alliances that ensure present conflict on one issue does not compromise future cooperation on a different issue. For example, a citizen could be a freemarket fiscal conservative while being vehemently anti-war and proLGBTQ rights. Under our current partisan issue alignment, this would mean
that she would more closely align with the Republican Party on the role of
government in regulating the economy but with the Democratic Party on foreign affairs and queer rights. This kind of pluralism ensures continued engagement and cooperation with both major political parties, with the ability
to move fluidly between them depending on the issue.
The citizen I described above—the one envisioned by James Madison
in Federalist No. 10 and observed in the mid-twentieth century by political
scientists theorizing American democratic pluralism—is of an increasingly
rare, endangered species. The culprit? Political polarization and partisan
sorting. Three political scientists describe political polarization—that is, the
movement of the two major political parties towards their own ideological
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poles and away from the middle—in the following way: “In the middle of
the twentieth century, the Democrats and the Republicans danced almost
cheek to cheek in their courtship of the political middle. Over the past thirty
years, the parties have deserted the center of the floor in favor of the
wings.” 27
The effects of political polarization on the functioning of the Madisonian machine have been well-documented by political scientists and government scholars. In Congress, for example, we have witnessed
unprecedented gridlock, shutdowns of government, a competitive “team”
mentality that has encouraged parties to use (or abuse) procedural rules to
their advantage, a weakened committee structure, more power shifted to
party leaders, and an all but eliminated representation of moderates in the
electorate. 28
The deleterious effects of polarization extend beyond Congress and our
elected representatives. Partisan identities now exert a powerful influence on
how Americans vote, how they think, and even with whom they choose to
affiliate.29 So-called “affective polarization”30 pulls Americans away from
other citizens with whom they might have ideological overlap and policy
agreement because they identify with the other party. Leading political scientists and scholars explain the origins and impacts of this particular brand
of polarization:

This is the antithesis of the Madisonian ideal of fluidity, movement, and
multi-dimensionality articulated in Federalist No. 10. When partisan

11/23/2020 10:40:39

27. NOLAN MCCARTY ET AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL
RICHES 1 (2008).
28. Kathryn Pearson, Rising Partisan Polarization in the US Congress, in PARCHMENT BARRIERS:
POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 35–57 (2018). See generally
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012); FRANCES E. LEE,
INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN (2016); SAMARA KLAN & YANNA
KRUPNIKOV, INDEPENDENT POLITICS: HOW AMERICAN DISDAIN FOR PARTIES LEADS TO POLITICAL
INACTION (2016).
29. See generally LILIANA MASON, UNCIVIL AGREEMENT: HOW POLITICS BECAME OUR IDENTITY
(2018).
30. See James N. Druckman & Matthew S. Levendusky, What do We Measure When we Measure
Affective Polarization?, 83 PUB. OPINION Q. 114 (2019).
31. Shanto Iyengar et al., The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United
States, 22 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 129, 129 (2019).
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While previously polarization was primarily seen only in issue-based
terms, a new type of division has emerged in the mass public in recent
years: Ordinary Americans increasingly dislike and distrust those from the
other party. Democrats and Republicans both say that the other party’s
members are hypocritical, selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across party lines. 31
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identities harden allegiances and drive political behavior, the result is more
rigidity on issues, fewer cross-cutting coalitions that facilitate cooperation
across “factions,” and more tribalism which resists engaging with the other
side, reinforcing the growing ideological divides between the two major parties.
B. Fragmented Media, Fake News and Alternative Facts

11/23/2020 10:40:39

32. MCCARTY ET AL., supra note 27.
33. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 28 at 58.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 62.
36. For a thorough and harrowing account of the impact of conservative talk radio on the Republican party and partisanship, see BRIAN ROSENWALD, TALK RADIO’S AMERICA: HOW AN INDUSTRY TOOK
OVER A POLITICAL PARTY THAT TOOK OVER THE UNITED STATES (2019).
37. See, e.g., Michaela Del Vicario et al., Echo Chambers: Emotional Contagion and Group Polarization on Facebook, 6 SCI. REP. 37825 (2016); Susan Jacobson et al., Open Media or echo chamber:
the use of links in audience discussions on the Facebook Pages of partisan news organizations, 19 INFO.
COMM. & SOC’Y 875 (2016); Walter Quattrociocchi et al., Echo Chambers on Facebook (June 13, 2016),
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=5190211211110250830310880830920070260040620270180260661170230960071131150
75091074067043099051062060010113068001094028093105123039071017081004072102069099120
01508802406004010302606808812602708201611601406901100001110607912200500107009700310
4108067090&EXT=pdf [https://perma.cc/7A66-ZMSR].
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So-called affective polarization has been an enabler of and exacerbated
by the well-documented fragmentation of the media and the rise of partisan
news. In the mid-twentieth century, during the height of cross-cutting coalitions, cooperation, and moderate parties that, to recall the language above,
“danced cheek to cheek,” 32 there were three major network news channels
where 70% of Americans received their news or political information.33 As
Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein explain, with the “telecommunications
revolution” and the advent of the internet, the “plethora of channels, websites
and other information options has fragmented audiences and radically
changed media business models.” 34 With more competition for eyeballs,
clicks, and revenue, cable news stations, network news stations, and forprofit internet sites have, as Mann and Ornstein characterize it, promoted
“sensationalism” and conflict over “sensible centrism.” 35
American citizens as consumers have bought in to this new media landscape, self-selecting into their own media silos populated by members of
their own “teams” (that is, political parties).36 This echo-chamber effect has
only been exacerbated by the rise of social media and Facebook. 37 Citizens
can self-select into certain news sources and block or unfriend anyone with
whom they disagree. Even more unsettling, recent work in media and politics
shows that when American citizens are actually confronted with political
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shows and programming and news with which they disagree, this has the
effect of intensifying their own partisan preferences rather than changing
their minds.38
Given this fragmented and hyper-polarized media landscape, we can
understand the effectiveness of Trump-era appeals to “alternative facts” 39
and allegations of “fake news.” 40 These tropes are simply extensions of the
partisan dynamics that have become increasingly salient for Americans over
the past three decades. They prevent legislators, politicians, and citizens
alike from hearing and processing political information outside the filter of
their partisan priors.
These dynamics are especially pernicious for the idealized functioning
of the United States Senate, compromising the role Madison envisioned for
that body as a deliberative refinery—a pressure valve for the release and
transformation of factional pressures and passions. Though a bit more removed from the electorate than their counterparts in the House of Representatives, U.S. Senators are not immune from the effects of political and
affective polarization. In fact, the current Senate is more polarized—as measured by the ideological distance between Democrats and Republicans—than
it has been at any point in history for which we have data (essentially, beginning in 1880). 41
The American people watched these tribal partisan dynamics play out
right before their eyes during the Senate trial of Donald Trump. Before the
Senate trial had even started, prominent Republicans, including the Senate
majority leader Mitch McConnell and Senator Lindsey Graham, went on the
record saying they had already made up their minds and that no evidence
42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 32 Side A
11/23/2020 10:40:39

38. See generally KEVIN ARCENEAUX & MARTIN JOHNSON, CHANGING MINDS OR CHANGING
CHANNELS?: PARTISAN NEWS IN AN AGE OF CHOICE (2013); DIANA C. MUTZ, IN-YOUR-FACE POLITICS:
THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNCIVIL MEDIA (2015).
39. See, e.g., Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House offered ‘alternative facts’ on crowd size,
CNN POL. (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/P3QC-U95D]; see also Hannah Jackson, ‘Sharpiegate’: What
Trump said and why the controversy is continuing, GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 10, 2019, 12:24 PM),
https://globalnews.ca/news/5881701/trump-sharpiegate-roundup/ [https://perma.cc/HR5C-RU3Z].
40. For an example of President Trump calling something “fake news” see his response on Twitter
to an official Getty White House photograph featuring his hair blowing in the wind and his orange-tinted
“tan” line visible, “More Fake News. This was photoshopped, obviously, but the wind was strong and the
hair looks good? Anything to demean!” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 8, 2020,
11:13
AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1226222654019035142?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.fox13news.com%2Fnews%2Fpresident-trump-says-this-pictureis-photoshopped [https://perma.cc/2CC2-R5UF]. On the impact of the actual spread of fake news and
disinformation via social media, see Soroush Vosoughi, et al., The spread of true and false news online,
359 SOC. SCI. 1146 (2018).
41. See Jeff Lewis, Polarization in Congress, VOTEVIEW.COM (Aug. 14, 2019),
https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization [https://perma.cc/T7PP-TC7L].
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would change their determination to acquit President Trump. As Graham
said at a forum in Qatar a month before the Senate trial, “I am trying to give
a pretty clear signal I have made up my mind . . . I’m not trying to pretend
to be a fair juror here.” 42 McConnell even went so far as to say (on Fox
News) that he was coordinating with the White House during the Senate trial:
“Everything I do during this, I’m coordinating with White House counsel . . .
there will be no difference between the [P]resident’s position and our position.” 43
Predictably, McConnell and the Senate Republicans voted along party
lines to block testimony from witnesses and to not introduce any new evidence at the trial, even after news leaked that former national security advisor
John Bolton had evidence corroborating the allegations against Donald
Trump that he had knowingly directed aid be withheld from Ukraine in exchange for their assistance in his own political reelection campaign.44 This
behavior is the very definition of party tribalism. It was also reflected (a) in
the media coverage of impeachment—with conservative outlets criticizing
the process as a “witch hunt” 45 that was seeking to overturn the 2016 election
results and liberal-leaning outlets expressing outrage at the Republicans running a “sham trial” 46 and betraying their oaths to the United States constitution—and (b) in public opinion—with 84% of Democrats supporting
impeachment joined only by 9% of Republicans.47 Moreover, there was almost no movement among these blocs during the entire process.48 In the end,
only one Republican, Senator Mitt Romney (R-UT), broke ranks to vote in
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42. Colby Itkowitz, Sen. Graham: ‘Not trying to pretend to be a fair juror’, WASH. POST (Dec. 14,
2019, 3:48 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/lindsey-graham-not-trying-to-pretend-to-bea-fair-juror-here/2019/12/14/dcaad02c-1ea8-11ea-b4c1-fd0d91b60d9e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/R7X5-5UJ7].
43. Jonathan Zimmerman, Impeachment: Republicans are in the tank for Trump, but Democrats
aren’t impartial either, USA TODAY (Jan, 23, 2020, 3:15 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/23/donald-trump-impeachment-trial-senate-impartial-evidence-column/4541616002/
[https://perma.cc/YWT7-9233].
44. Carl Hulse et al., How Mitch McConnell delivered Acquittal for Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/trump-impeachment.html [https://perma.cc/5XZJKX2D].
45. Indeed, there was an entire Podcast on Fox News Radio called “The Impeachment Witch Hunt.”
The Impeachment Witch Hunt, FOX NEWS (Feb. 6, 2020), https://radio.foxnews.com/podcast/the-impeachment-witch-hunt/ [https://perma.cc/WUL7-523X].
46. See Michael Shear & Nicholas Fandos, Republicans Block Impeachment Witnesses, Clearing
Path for Trump’s Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-impeachment-trial.html [https://perma.cc/RXQ5-SL4J].
47. Id.
48. See Aaron Bycoffe, et al., Did Americans Support Removing Trump from Office?,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb 12, 2020, 8:16 AM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/impeachment-polls/
[https://perma.cc/M4TL-DQ3Q].
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favor of conviction on the charge of abuse of power while Democrats voted
as a partisan bloc to convict.
Given what we know now about political behavior in this era of hyperpolarization and partisanship, both the impeachment and the acquittal of
Donald Trump are completely unsurprising. When we apply these insights
to Professor Turley’s analysis of the critical role of the Senate in impeachment, the consequences of this are clear. The impeachment and removal
power provided for in the United States Constitution can no longer be understood to function as a Madisonian tool of factional resolution a la Federalist
No. 10. Political polarization and party tribalism prevented the full and fair
airing of facts, hearing of witnesses, and presentation of evidence in the case
against Donald Trump. The deliberative capacities of the United States Senate and, perhaps most importantly, of the American constituents have been
handicapped by affective polarization—that is, the inability to hear and process political information without the filter of a partisan lens.
In recognition of our current American reality, there is reason to believe—as one political scientist has put it—that impeachment simply does
not work. 49 However, as I illustrate in the next section, this assessment might
be only half-correct. Evidence from comparative politics scholars suggests
that impeachment, when followed closely by a new election, can provide a
“hard reset” for democratic norms and a political system. That being the case,
the impeachment and removal trial of President Donald Trump can be understood through the lens of Madison’s Federalist No. 51 as an “auxiliary
precaution” that might serve to safeguard the “primary control” on abuse of
power—that is, the electoral process.

A. Federalist No. 51 as an Alternative Touchstone for Understanding
Impeachment
When polarization and strong partisanship become the gears that drive
political behavior and partisan media, the mechanism of transmission of our
political information, key parts of the so-called “Madisonian machine,”
break down. Given the dynamics driving this breakdown, which were on full
display during the impeachment hearings and trial of Donald Trump, it is no
longer useful or accurate to characterize impeachment, as Professor Turley
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49. Jennifer N. Victor, Why Impeachment Does Not Work, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 7, 2020, 3:12 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/why-impeachment-doesnt-work-opinion-1486307 [https://perma.cc/87HTCR62].
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has, as a tool of factional resolution and a mechanism of deliberative democracy a la Federalist No. 10.
This does not mean that the impeachment power can no longer be understood as Madisonian at all or that the process of impeachment has been
rendered entirely vestigial by partisanship and polarization. If we ground our
understanding of the impeachment power and process in Madison’s other
most famous essay in The Federalist Papers, we glean a slightly different
perspective on the scope and potential of impeachment:
But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others . . . . If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor
internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people
is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. 50
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50. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 318–319 (James Madison).
51. Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript [https://perma.cc/GQ9Z-GEZ3] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020).
52. On the weaknesses and deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, see generally Douglas G.
Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution, 34
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 249 (1997).
53. See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1373 (1998); see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL (1995);
Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, 8 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 196, 210
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Federalist No. 51 gets to the very crux of the constitutional enterprise
Madison and his contemporaries were undertaking. It articulates “the great
difficulty” of framing a government that would be powerful enough to govern but not so powerful that it would become tyrannical. Madison and his
colleagues had experienced firsthand the so-charged “absolute tyranny” 51 of
King George and had then overcorrected by designing a government that
turned out to be too weak and decentralized to be effective—the Articles of
Confederation. 52 The new United States Constitution would be an exercise
in striking the proper balance between power and control.
Impeachment is a mechanism of control—one of many “constitutional
means” and “auxiliary precautions” Madison identified in the structure of the
Constitution that would serve to mitigate or prevent the accumulation and
abuse of power by public officials. 53 Indeed, Martin Diamond referred to

42699-ckt_95-2 Sheet No. 34 Side A

11/23/2020 10:40:39

HOLLIS BRUSKY MACRO 1 FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

IMPEACHMENT AS A ‘MADISONIAN DEVICE’

10/18/2020 3:30 PM

511

these “auxiliary precautions” as a vital part of “the restraining spirit” of the
Constitution, 54 while Joseph Kobylka and Bradley Kent Carter noted that
these were built in as “defenses against the dark side of human nature.”55
The view of impeachment as an “auxiliary precaution” or additional safeguard against tyranny aligns with how most scholars and legal historians
have characterized the animating spirit of the power. As Michael Gerhardt
notes in his exhaustive review of the history and meaning of impeachment,
there is “relatively widespread recognition of the paradigmatic case for impeachment as being based on the abuse of power.” 56
Alexander Hamilton’s characterization of impeachable offenses in Federalist No. 65 provides additional evidence that the clause was meant to
guard against “the misconduct of public men” and to provide a mechanism
of redress for society for “the abuse or violation of some public trust.” 57
James Madison himself, speaking at the ratification convention for the new
constitution in Virginia, assuaged fears about the breadth of the presidential
pardon power and its potential to “establish tyranny” by pointing to the impeachment clause as the “one security” against such abuse of power.58 Impeachment can thus be understood as one of many mechanisms built into the
Madisonian machine to, in the parlance of Federalist No. 51, “oblige [the
government] to control itself.”59
However, the “primary control” on tyranny and abuse of power, Madison reminds us in the same breath, is a “dependence on the people.” 60 In
political science, we refer to this dependence on the people as the “electoral
connection.” 61 In more colloquial parlance, it is often said that if we do not
like what our public officials are doing we can “vote the bums out.”62
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(1991); Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, If Angels Were to Govern: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 462–65 (1991).
54. See Martin Diamond, Conservatives, Liberals and the Constitution, 1 PUB. INT. 96, 97 (1965).
55. Joseph F. Kobylka & Bradley K. Carter, Madison, ‘The Federalist’, and the Constitutional
Order: Human Nature and Institutional Structure, 20 POLITY 190, 190 (1987).
56. Michael J. Gerhardt, Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 604
(1999).
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 65, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
58. Tom Ginsburg et al., The Uses and Abuses of Presidential Impeachment, 88 U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 21).
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 1, at 319 (James Madison).
60. Id.
61. See generally DAVID MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale University
Press, 1st ed. 1974).
62. See, e.g., Douglas Bloomfield, Washington Watch: Vote the bums out, JERUSALEM POST (Dec.
25, 2019, 8:34 PM), https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Washington-Watch-Vote-the-bums-out-612129
[https://perma.cc/57SL-VTU2] (“We already have term limits. It’s called elections. Vote the bums out.”).
See also Ethan M. Tucker, Vote the Bums Out: The Call for Term Limits Is Foolish and Spineless, HARV.
CRIMSON (Oct. 26, 1994), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/1994/10/26/vote-the-bums-out-
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pbwatchb-out/ [https://perma.cc/8KXT-J6PM]; Dante Chinni, ‘Throw the bums out’ coalition changes
shape in 2018, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2018, 5:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/firstread/throw-bums-out-coalition-changes-shape-2018-n883986 [https://perma.cc/2PAD-N2JX] (“In every
election there is always a group of disgruntled voters who want to ‘throw the bums out,’ and poll numbers
show they’re back in 2018.”); Albor Ruiz, In 2020, throw the bums out, AL DIA NEWS (Dec. 30, 2019),
https://aldianews.com/articles/politics/opinion/2020-throw-bums-out/57212
[https://perma.cc/6NN69H8H] (“Come November throw the bums out!”).
63. For a comprehensive and detailed account of the Watergate scandal as it related to President
Nixon’s reelection efforts, see generally FRED EMERY, WATERGATE: THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS AND THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON (Simon & Schuster, 1st ed. 1995).
64. See Gerhardt, supra note 56, at 604.
65. Philip B. Kurland, Watergate, Impeachment, and the Constitution, 45 MISS. L.J. 531, 592
(1974).
66. See Michael Schudson, Notes on Scandal and the Watergate Legacy, 47 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST
1231, 1232 (2004).
67. See id. at 1231–38.
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Regardless of what we call it, the vitality of this first-order check on tyranny
and tyrannical behavior depends entirely on a free, functioning, and accessible electoral system.
This, I argue, is where impeachment can play its most important role as
a Madisonian “auxiliary precaution.” First, it can be deployed to address
abuses of power and betrayal of public trust in between election cycles. Second, it can and should be deployed in cases where a public official is attempting to influence and manipulate the “primary control” itself. That is, from a
Madisonian perspective, it is especially appropriate to initiate impeachment
proceedings against a public official who is attempting to influence or manipulate an upcoming election.
To wit, the discovery of a coordinated operation to meddle with and
influence an upcoming election (Watergate) 63 is precisely what motivated
the impeachment process that led to the resignation of Richard Nixon—a
case that is widely accepted to be the “paradigmatic case” for impeachment
in American history. 64 As Philip Kurland describes, the real “crisis” of Watergate was the evidence of a slow but steady trend towards “the spectre of
totalitarianism” and the lack of real checks against it.65 The Watergate Scandal, to recall, involved a burglary of the Democratic National Committee
headquarters by CREEP (the Committee to Reelect the President). The investigation and the initiation of impeachment hearings revealed other related
illegal campaign practices, targeting and harassment of political “enemies,”
and other so-called “dirty tricks” coordinated by Richard Nixon and his supporters to ensure his reelection.66 And then, of course, there was the attempted cover-up and obstruction of justice. 67
Echoes of the Nixon-era Watergate scandal are difficult to ignore with
the most recent impeachment against President Donald Trump. According to
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Congress, Trump was found guilty of “Abuse of Power” (Article I) for pressuring Ukraine to announce an investigation into political rival Joe Biden,
“while withholding military aid and dangling a head-of-state meeting,
thereby corrupting the integrity of U.S. elections.”68 Trump was also found
guilty of “Obstruction of Congress” (Article II) for withholding documents
and preventing witnesses from testifying. 69
In Madisonian terms, the House found that Trump abused his powers to
manipulate “the primary control” our system has for controlling tyranny—
elections. Additionally, Trump and his administration compromised an “auxiliary precaution”—congressional oversight—by shielding information and
hampering their ability to investigate him for wrongdoing. Indeed, from a
Madisonian perspective, we might say that the Trump case—rather than the
Nixon case—is in fact the paradigmatic case for impeachment. Without mentioning Madison here, Professor Pamela Karlan underscored this point during her testimony at the House impeachment hearing:
But the Framers of our Constitution realized that elections alone could not
guarantee that the United States would remain a republic. One of the key
reasons for including an impeachment power was the risk that unscrupulous officials might try to rig the election process. At the Constitutional
Convention, William Davie warned that unless the Constitution contained
an impeachment provision, a president might “spare no efforts or means
whatever to get himself re-elected.” 70

B. Impeachment + Elections = “Hard Reboot” of the Political System
As I reviewed in Part II, the same forces that have conspired to weaken
political accountability across the board—polarization, party tribalism, and
“fake news”—have conspired to weaken the ability of this check to be effective in removing an impeached President from power. But recent work by
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68. Domenico Montanaro, ‘Impeachment Lite’? How Articles Against Trump Compare to Clinton’s
and Nixon’s, NPR (Dec. 13, 2019, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/12/13/787496291/trump-dismisses-charges-against-him-as-impeachment-lite-is-he-right [https://perma.cc/HPN6-VQ74].
69. Id.
70. Pamela S. Karlan, Opening Statement of Professor Pamela S. Karlan (Dec. 2, 2019) at 3,
https://d3i6fh83elv35t.cloudfront.net/static/2019/12/Karlan-Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79RMRTNQ].
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By abusing the powers and privileges of the office of the presidency,
sparing “no means whatever” to get oneself “re-elected” and to “rig the election process,” this abuse of power and public trust gets to the very heart of
why Madison and his contemporaries put the impeachment clause in the
Constitution in the first place.
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71. Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 5.
72. Id. at 58.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 54–55.
75. See generally Eleanor Clift, The Watergate Babies Remade Washington. Could the Trump Babies be Coming To Do it Again?, THE DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2018, 1:36 AM),
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-watergate-babies-remade-washington-could-the-trump-babies-becoming-to-do-it-again [https://perma.cc/B779-JGL9].
76. See generally JOHN A. LAWRENCE. THE CLASS OF ‘74: CONGRESS AFTER WATERGATE AND
THE ROOTS OF PARTISANSHIP (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1st ed. 2018).
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comparative political scientists on impeachment gives us reason to believe
that the impeachment process could have important downstream effects for
the American political system.
New research from Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Hug, and David Landau examines the dynamics of impeachment from a global perspective and provides,
in their words, “the first comprehensive analysis of how constitutions globally have addressed removals, and what the consequences of different design
choices are likely to be.” 71 Combining a large-n data set of impeachment and
removal globally with more granular cases studies of South Korea, Brazil,
Paraguay, South Africa and the United States, these scholars find that, far
from being a vestigial constitutional tail, “presidential impeachment in practice is about far more than removing criminals or other bad actors; it often
serves as an exit from the deep structural crises that presidential (and semipresidential) systems of government sometimes undergo.” 72
This “exit” from crisis is especially possible, as these scholars note,
when the design of impeachment calls for holding new elections after a head
of state is impeached. They point to South Korea’s design, which calls for
new elections sixty days after the impeachment process has concluded, while
noting that many other countries also call for new elections on the heels of
impeachment.73 Holding new elections after an impeachment, in their assessment, allows “the constitutional order to hit the ‘reset button’” which, they
argue, “seems to us like a useful tool.” 74 The United States does not have
“new elections” built into their constitutional impeachment design. We do,
however, fortuitously, have new elections coming up at the end of this year.
If we believe that the experience of other countries is instructive, these elections have the potential for Americans to initiate a “hard reboot” of our political system—to hit control-alt-delete and start again.
Such a thing would not be unprecedented. The so-called “Watergate
Babies,” 75 or less controversially but more uncommonly referred to as the
“Class of ‘74” 76 elected in the wake of Richard Nixon’s impeachment proceedings and resignation, ran and won on an anti-corruption platform. This
class of Democratic congressmen, as described by one journalist, were
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“young, idealistic liberals who had been swept into office on a promise to
clean up government, end the war in Vietnam, and rid the nation’s capital of
the kind of corruption and dirty politics the Nixon White House had
wrought.” 77 As other observers have noted, the resignation and disgrace of
Richard Nixon opened up a rare window for bipartisan cooperation on anticorruption legislation that would seek to prevent future Watergate-type scenarios. Campaign finance legislation, the Ethics in Government Act, and
amendments to the Freedom of Information Act and to the Budget Impoundment Act were representative of the post-Watergate congressional effort to
“institutionalize” instruments “of self-purification” in government, to quote
Republican Senator Jacob Javits.78
To be sure, there is good reason to be skeptical that the diverse, energized, SQUAD-led group of freshman elected in 2018 combined with a projected “blue wave” in 2020 would lead to the same kind of bipartisan
cooperation that we saw in the wake of Watergate. Part II details the seismic
shifts in partisanship and hyper-polarization pushing against that possibility.
That being said, there is at least one encouraging sign that independentminded Republicans might be willing to collaborate with Democrats on anticorruption and reigning in presidential power. Republican and former CIA
operations officer Evan McMullin, who has been one of the strongest critics
of Trump, has founded a reform-centric non-profit “Stand Up Republic,”79
and has partnered with an organization led by former Obama administration
lawyers to develop what they call a “Blueprint for the Day After.”80 Described as “an ambitious set of proposals for quick legislative action at whatever point Trump leaves office,” 81 the blueprint focuses on the following:
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77. Matt Stoller, How Democrats Killed Their Populist Soul, ATLANTIC (Oct. 24, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-democrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/
[https://perma.cc/L69D-LVLV].
78. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 24, at 181.
79. See STAND UP REPUBLIC, https://standuprepublic.com/ [perma.cc/5JDS-MRZD] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020).
80. See generally PROTECT DEMOCRACY & STAND UP IDEAS, THE REPUBLIC AT RISK: AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY ONE YEAR INTO THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2018) https://standuprepublic.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/07/TheRepublicAtRisk.pdf [perma.cc/JM5X-DQ63].
81. Clift, supra note 75.
82. Id.
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(1) restoring the integrity of elections, (2) shoring up limits on executive
power, including restoring the Constitutional check on the President’s war
powers, (3) ensuring that government works for the people, not the personal interests of the President and his allies, (4); protecting inclusive and
fact-based democratic participation, and (5) rebuilding faith in the project
of American government. 82
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Again, the parallels here to the Watergate Babies’ congressional
agenda—an agenda that, if it did not provide a “hard reset” to the political
system, at the very least installed some anti-malware virus detection software
onto it—are noteworthy. Both agendas are responding to what Philip Kurland called in his analysis “the spectre of totalitarianism” 83 and both seek to
shore up the checks—both primary (elections and democratic participation)
and auxiliary (checks and balances) against the perceived prospect of tyranny. In other words, to circle back to the driving point of this article, both
agendas are distinctly Madisonian a la Federalist No. 51.
CONCLUSION
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83. See Kurland, supra note 65.
84. See Li Zhou, ‘He is not who you are’: Adam Schiff makes last-ditch plea to Senate Republicans,
VOX (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/3/21121447/adam-schiff-house-impeachment
[perma.cc/7P42-HPBD].
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With the benefit of hindsight—and the impeachment hearings and Senate removal trial of Donald Trump now behind us—it is clear that Professor
Jonathan Turley’s idealized conception of the impeachment process functioning as a tool for factional resolution and deliberative democracy is now
defunct. Political science predicted this outcome perfectly. As Part II details,
the forces that now dominate our political landscape—polarization, party
tribalism, fragmented news and alternative facts—have conspired to turn the
impeachment clauses into something of a constitutional vestigial tail. That
being said, while the impeachment process (predictably) failed to remove
Trump as President of the United States, I argue that the process could still
have meaningful downstream effects.
Relying on recent research by comparative political scientists, there is
reason to believe that this process, because it is followed closely by a general
election, could help provide a “hard reboot” of our political system—a system that, by almost any conceivable metric, is in crisis. After all, some version of a reboot is precisely what happened in the wake of Watergate. A
Democratic Congress and President could pass anti-corruption reforms for
the post-Trump era; reforms that would strengthen and protect the “primary
control” against tyranny—elections—and shore up some of the “auxiliary”
checks that have been weakened if not altogether destroyed since the 1970s.
It would be a moment to say, as House impeachment manager and California
Congressman Adam Schiff did in his closing argument to the Senate asking
his Republican colleagues to convict Trump, “Truth matters to you. Right
matters to you. You are decent. He is not who you are.” 84
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A reset election in November would be the moment for Americans to
say, definitively, “[Trump] is not who [we] are.” Or maybe the election goes
the other way. The “primary control” against tyranny and against the evermore-visible “spectre of totalitarianism” fails.85 And we will be forced to
concede that yet another part of the so-called “Madisonian machine” has broken down under the weight of hyper-polarization, partisanship, and “alternative facts.” In that case, we would need to concede that Trump is “who we
are.” But the machinery the Republicans are building around Trump is not
the Madisonian machine. It is the machinery of absolute tyranny.
As political scientists are all-too-fond of reminding everyone, and as
President Barack Obama reportedly said to Republican leadership in the
wake of the last “blue wave,” “elections have consequences.” 86
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85. See Kurland, supra note 65.
86. See, e.g., Michael Steele, The SCOTUS nomination clearly demonstrates that elections have
consequences, THE HILL (July 11, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/396476-thescotus-nomination-clearly-demonstrates-elections-have-consequences [perma.cc/24M8-9ZA9].

